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Abstract
In theory, the presence of foreign banks has spillover and compe-
tition eﬀects on domestic banks leading to higher eﬃciency. Next to
foreign banks from industrialized countries (north-south banks), for-
eign banks from developing countries (south-south banks) are impor-
tant investors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). South-south banks are
either regional investors or are hosted in developing countries beyond
SSA. This paper studies the competitive advantages and strategies of
north-south as well as regional and non-regional south-south banks
from a theoretical perspective. Moreover, the study examines theoret-
ically whether these foreign banks induce diﬀerent eﬀects on domestic
banks.
To explore these issues empirically, 80 domestic banks in 17 coun-
tries of SSA between 1999 and 2006 are considered. The results show
that the presence of north-south and south-south banks positively af-
fects the costs of domestic banks. This suggests that domestic banks
invest in the modern practices of foreign banks. Domestic banks’ mar-
gins are positively related to the presence of north-south and non-
regional south-south banks indicating a lack of competitive pressure.
In contrast, regional south-south banks have a negative impact on the
margins of domestic banks.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F21, F23, F36
Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, south-south banks, spillover and com-
petition eﬀects, eﬃciency
11 Introduction
The costs of ﬁnancial intermediation, measured in terms of net interest mar-
gins, are still high in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Al-Haschimi 2007: 1). This
paper analyzes if the presence of the foreign subsidiaries of multinational
banks (MNBs) has slightly increased the eﬃciency of domestic banks in
SSA through spillover and competition eﬀects.
Next to foreign banks headquartered in industrialized countries (north-
south banks), foreign banks from developing countries (south-south banks)
are playing an increasingly important role in SSA. South-south banks are
either regional investors from countries of SSA or non-regional investors
hosted in countries beyond SSA. Depending on their competitive advantages
and expansion strategies, the presence of north-south and south-south banks
may have diﬀerent eﬀects on domestic banks. To explore the eﬀects of
foreign banks in general and the eﬀects of north-south as well as regional
and non-regional south-south banks on domestic banks in particular from
an empirical perspective, a unique data set is compiled from balance sheet
data of about 80 domestic banks in 17 countries of SSA for the years 1999 to
2006. The empirical model of Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004), who study the
determinants of bank eﬃciency of 1400 banks across 72 countries, serves as
the baseline for this study. Their model has already been applied to study
the determinants of net interest margins of commercial banks in SSA (see
Al-Haschimi 2007).
Empirical studies related to this paper are Hermes and Lensink (2002),
Claessens and Lee (2003) and Lensink and Hermes (2004). The authors
study the eﬀects of foreign bank entry on domestic banks in low-income
countries. For example, Hermes and Lensink (2002) show that domestic
banks beneﬁt from modern bank techniques and practices of foreign banks.
As there is a lack of competitive pressure from foreign entrants, domestic
banks are able to charge higher net interest margins.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to study the eﬀects
of north-south and south-south banks on domestic banks in countries of
SSA. The results of the empirical examination show that the overhead costs
of domestic banks are positively aﬀected by foreign banks, and especially
regional south-south banks. As domestic banks invest in foreign practices
and technologies, their costs rise. The net interest margins of domestic banks
are also positively related to north-south and non-regional south-south banks
indicating a lack of competitive pressure. In contrast, regional south-south
banks negatively aﬀect domestic banks’ net interest margins.
Section 2 builds the theoretical foundation of this study. In Section 3
the empirical study is conducted. Section 4 summarizes the ﬁndings of this
paper.
22 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Eclectic Theory of Multinational Banks
MNBs from industrialized countries like UK’s Barclays and Standard Char-
tered Bank, the French BNP Paribas, Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale and Credit Agricole,
the Banco Comercial Portugues and the US’s Citigroup are important in-
vestors in SSA (Moin 2008, Honohan/Beck 2007: 92f.). According to the
Eclectic Theory (Cho 1985: 56, Dunning 1989: 16), MNBs from industrial-
ized countries are disadvantaged in SSA because of institutional, cultural,
and spatial distance. Moreover, they face diﬀerent consumer preferences
compared to those of their home country customers (Hymer 1976: 34f.). As
MNBs from industrialized countries suﬀer from the liability of foreignness,
they have to possess ownership-, internalization- and location-speciﬁc ad-
vantages (Cho 1985: 56, Dunning 1989: 16). Size, state-of-the-art practices
and technologies, diﬀerentiated products and services, knowledge, experi-
ence in multinational banking operations and serving particular customer
groups may be some of the ownership-speciﬁc advantages of MNBs from
industrialized countries. Location-speciﬁc advantages of MNBs generally
apply to diﬀerent regulative structures or reserve requirements (Cho 1985:
58, 63). Moreover, economic diﬀerences, e.g. regarding the size of an econ-
omy or the development stage generate location-speciﬁc advantages. The
economic integration of host and source country through trade and foreign
direct investment can be an advantage, because of already existing customer
relationships (Cho 1985: 58). Ownership- and location-speciﬁc advantages
are essential but not suﬃcient for multinationalization. Rather, internal-
ization within the bank is necessary to exploit these advantages (Uiboupin
2005: 28).
Next to MNBs from industrialized countries, MNBs from developing
countries are important investors in SSA. These banks are either regional
multinationals, like Stanbic Bank from South Africa or Togo’s Ecobank, or
non-regional multinationals like Bank of Baroda from India. The Eclectic
Theory of MNBs does not distinguish between MNBs from industrialized
and developing countries in its original setting. A ﬁrst eclectic analysis
of MNBs from developing countries in particular is undertaken by Petrou
(2007). According to the author, MNBs from developing countries also ex-
ploit their ownership- and internalization-speciﬁc advantages. However, the
main diﬀerence compared to MNBs from industrialized countries is related
to their location decision. MNBs from developing countries do not have
the same capabilities and funding resources compared to their industrial-
ized counterparts. Merely for their chosen foreign markets like MNCs from
the same source country, expatriates and immigrants they possess some kind
of ownership-speciﬁc advantages in the form of special knowledge about the
target market, skills or reputation. The expansion of MNBs from devel-
3oping countries is limited to small market niches like customers from the
same host country and they cannot strategically choose their target mar-
kets. Rather than following proﬁt and risk diversiﬁcation opportunities,
MNBs from developing countries select host countries where they expect to
gain new competencies and support their reputation.
However, the competitive advantages of MNBs from developing coun-
tries may be more manifold, especially if they invest in other developing
nations like SSA. First, they are less disadvantaged in being a foreigner
as the similar stage of economic development or development process may
provide a location-speciﬁc advantage. Second, as the quality of institutions
is closely connected to a countrys’ economic development level (Acemoglu
et al. 2001: 1369), more economically distant countries face larger diﬀer-
ences in institutional quality. Such diﬀerences may be a barrier to adapt
to local banking practices (Mian 2006: 1495). South-south banks should
be better able to assess the uncertainty of economic conditions in other de-
veloping nations (Claessens et al. 2008: 22), and especially in low-income
countries (Claessens/Van Horen 2007: 4, Worldbank 2006: 120f.), compared
to north-south banks. Therefore, they can simply exploit location-speciﬁc
advantages like similarities of business cultures as well as economic and in-
stitutional similarities. South-south banks may apply their advantages that
are speciﬁc to the stage of development of their host country like adapted
business models, skills and distribution capabilities of cheap and diﬀeren-
tiated products. They may be better able to identify the speciﬁc needs of
low-income customers in developing nations. For example, complex bank
accounts for household ﬁnance are generally too costly and are inappropri-
ate for many African citizens, as they actually need basic transaction or
saving accounts (Honohan/Beck 2007: 61). As some level of adaptation
of ownership-speciﬁc advantages is necessary (Jensen/Szulanski 2004: 510)
to make them work within the existing cultures and conditions of foreign
markets, south-south might have less problems in being a foreigner in SSA
compared to their industrialized counterparts.
The familiarity with the entry market under consideration may be espe-
cially strong if south-south banks are hosted in the same geographic region.
Those banks may have a better understanding of local conditions. In fact,
about 95% of MNBs in SSA invest in other countries of SSA (Claessens et
al. 2008: 36). As MNBs from African countries follow regional expansion
strategies, the spatial distance between host and home countries is smaller
compared to MNBs from other non-regional countries. Hence, they are
less disadvantaged as a foreigner because of spatial proximity. Geograph-
ical proximity often implies a similar cultural background as well as the
same language and ethnical roots, whereby the business and risk assessment
of banks is facilitated (Claessens et al. 2008: 22, Van Horen 2007: 90).
Especially, in SSA the knowledge of unique cultural behavior is essential
(Luiz/Charalambous 2009: 310). As there is a high interpersonal contact
4within the banking sector, relationships, personal communication, and trust
are of vital importance (Luiz/Charalambous 2009: 308ﬀ.). Luiz and Char-
alambous (2009: 311f.) argue that South African banks have advantages
when operating in SSA, because of their regional understanding and spatial
proximity. Hence, they may have a comparative advantage to foreign banks
from countries beyond SSA.
The similarities in political, economic and business environments in
countries of SSA (Claessens et al. 2008: 22) may provide location-speciﬁc
advantages for foreign banks from SSA. For example, as banks like Bank
of Africa from Benin and Ecobank from Togo are confronted with similar
problems in their home country, they are able to overcome the obstacles
in other countries of the region (Claessens et al. 2009: 22). For example,
Togos Ecobank has experience with the extent and importance of informal
business practices in other African countries and develops African solutions
to overcome these problems (Claessens et al. 2008: 22).
A principle concern of foreign bank market entry is the fear that these
banks primarily concentrate on large, internationally-oriented corporations.
Honohan and Beck (2007: 95) and Games (2004: 27) point out that industri-
alized MNBs like Standard Chartered and BNP Paribas mainly serve large
international trading companies as well as high-income clients in SSA. The
remaining market segments, like SMEs, remain underserved. In contrast,
Stanbic and Absa from South Africa recently have shifted their business fo-
cus on lower- and middle-income clients (Honohan/Beck 2007: 95). MNBs
from African countries have fewer problems to adapt to local conditions
and face lower transaction costs to overcome the rigidity of traditions and
business practices, when they invest in other African countries. They have
already experience in doing business within challenging environments and
they might more often be able to adopt soft lending techniques and overcome
the informational opaqueness of SMEs.
Banks from the same geographic region may have a similar comparative
advantage to other foreign banks like local banks, because of their knowledge
of local conditions and their ability to screen and supervise local borrowers
(Nini 2004: 1, Worldbank 2006: 121). An example is a debt-rating model
focusing on limited disclosures common to African SMEs that was developed
by Togos Ecobank (Essien 2007: 5).
The argumentation considers especially the situation in which MNBs
initially enter developing countries. In the course of time, north-south and
non-regional banks will also gain in experience of the local market and the
prevailing customer preferences. Hence, they may also seek for new risk
diversiﬁcation and proﬁt opportunities. As they have the capital to invest in
appropriate lending technologies and risk management techniques, the SME
segment as well as the mass consumer market may also become proﬁtable
for these banks.
52.2 Spillover and Competition Eﬀects of Foreign Banks
As MNBs transfer ownership-speciﬁc advantages in foreign markets to en-
sure the competitiveness of their subsidiaries who suﬀer from the liability
of foreignness, the market entry of foreign banks may have spillover and
competition eﬀects on domestic banks. Domestic banks in SSA may beneﬁt
from the competitive advantages of foreign banks by copying their modern
practices, products, and technologies. As foreign banks disturb the exis-
tent market equilibrium, domestic banks are forced to act in order to keep
their market shares. Both types of externalities can enhance the eﬃciency
of domestic banks.
Generally south-south banks are less advanced with respect to technolo-
gies and banking practices. Hence, their market entry might not induce the
same eﬃciency eﬀects compared to north-south banks (Worldbank 2006:
124). In contrast, the knowledge and technological gap between domes-
tic and north-south banks oﬀers a lot of learning possibilities and there is
a larger potential for spillover eﬀects. However, too many diﬀerences be-
tween management practices and skills of managers or employees or the
deployment of technologies can impair the absorptive capacity of domes-
tic banks and therefore reduce the extent of spillover eﬀects. South-south
banks, and especially regional multinationals in SSA, may possess suitable
banking practices, techniques and technologies for banking markets of SSA
for which domestic banks have a high absorptive capacity. A better suitabil-
ity implies smaller costs of adoption, because less adaptation arrangements
are necessary. As the business models of south-south banks are less cor-
porate and more informal than those of north-south banks, spillover eﬀects
may be fostered.
Competition from foreign entrants may have positive or negative eﬀects.
If domestic banks have a high absorptive capacity, they can become more
eﬃcient and catch up to foreign competitors. In contrast, if the knowledge
and technological gap are too large, they cannot compete with their foreign
counterparts and are squeezed out of the market (Uiboupin: 2005: 38).
If foreign banks ‘cherry-pick’ the most proﬁtable and less risky customers
like MNCs or large export oriented local companies, domestic banks are
left with credit lending to the more risky customer, whereby their eﬃciency
can be reduced (Honohan/Beck 2007: 95, Havrylchyk and Jurzyk 2005: 4,
Pomerleano/Voijta 2002: 66, Clarke et al. 2001: 5). Moreover, the extent
of spillover eﬀects might be small, ‘because of the special features of the
retail market, one cannot analyze small retail loans by simply downsizing
the models used to analyze large wholesale loans’ (Allen et al. 2004: 727). If
south-south banks are more often active in the SME segment, the danger of
crowding out is smaller, as domestic banks have better knowledge about local
markets. They have to become more eﬃcient, in order to stay competitive.
Summarized, the extent of spillover and competition eﬀects of north-
6south and south-south banks’ presence on domestic banks in SSA cannot be
determined a priori. Hence, an empirical analysis seems to be indicated.
3 Empirical Examination
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation and Data
To exploit the impact of foreign banks on the eﬃciency of domestic banks
in SSA, the following equation is estimated:1
eijt = β1 + β2fbtbjt + β4bijt + β5cij + εijt (1)
where i identiﬁes domestic banks, j countries of SSA and t the time
period. Equation 1 explains the eﬃciency of domestic banks eijt by the ratio
of foreign banks to total banks fbtbjt, bank-speciﬁc variables bijt, country-
speciﬁc variables cjt and an error term εijt.
Moreover, to diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of north-south and south-
south bank presence, equation 1 is adjusted:
eijt = β1 + β2nbtbjt + β3sbtbjt + β4bijt + β5cij + εijt (2)
where nbtbjt reﬂects the ratio north-south banks to total banks and sbtbjt
the ratio of south-south banks to total banks in country j at time t.
To explore if there are any diﬀerences between the eﬀects of regional and
non-regional south-south banks, the following equation is estimated:
eijt = β1 + β2nbtbjt + β3ssasbtbjt + β4nssasbtbjt + β5bijt + β6cjt + εijt (3)
where ssasbtbjt reﬂects the ratio of regional (SSA) south-south banks to
total banks, and nssasbtbjt the ratio non-regional (non SSA) south-south
banks to total banks.
Bank-Speciﬁc Variables
All bank-speciﬁc variables are from IBCA’s Bankscope database. The de-
pendent bank-speciﬁc variables eijt and independent bank-speciﬁc variables
bijt are from the balance sheet data of 80 domestic banks in 17 low-income
countries of SSA for the period 1999 to 2006.
First, the net interest margin (interest income minus interest expense) to
total earning assets (net margin) serves as a measure of eﬃciency. Second,
the ratio of overhead costs to total assets (costs) is used as dependent vari-
able eijt. As net margins, large costs may reﬂect ineﬃciencies and market
power of banks (Levine 2003: 9).
1Claessens and Lee (2003) apply the same econometric model.
7The bank-speciﬁc control variables bijt were selected on the basis of gen-
eral studies on the determinants of the eﬃciency of commercial banks (e.g.
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt/Huizinga 1999). The model
of Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt/Huizinga (1999) has been applied to study net margins
of commercial banks in SSA (see Al-Haschimi 2007) and also serves as the
baseline in this paper.
The ﬁrst bank-speciﬁc control variable is bank size (size). Size is mea-
sured by the log of total assets of individual banks, accounting for possible
economies of scale of larger banks. Economies of scale occur if the per unit
average production cost of a ﬁrm declines with increasing output (Ikhide
2000: 17). Despite the small scale of the ﬁnancial systems in countries in
SSA (Beck et al. 2009: 5), banks may beneﬁt from economies of scale (see
Flamini et al. 2009). The gap between the interest rate paid to savers
and the rate charged to borrowers are the result of intermediation costs like
screening and monitoring borrowers (Dabla-Norris/Floerkemeier 2007: 5).
As intermediation costs have a ﬁxed cost element (Dabla-Norris/Floerkemeier
2007: 5), economies of scale are important (Bossone et al. 2002: 106). Gen-
erally, net margins may be reduced by large banks if there are increasing
returns to scale. In contrast, if larger banks have a higher market power,
net margins may increase (Levine 2003: 8). Previous studies ﬁnd a negative
relationship between size and net margin (see Beck and Hesse 2009: 193)
and between size and costs (Micco et al. 2007: 228).
In order to account for a possible non-linear relationship and hence dis-
economies of scale, the square of the log of total assets (sizesqr) also serves
as a control variable. Diseconomies of scale occur when the average costs
per unit increase beyond a certain production level, because of managerial
and other ineﬃciencies (Ikhide 2000: 17). A positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient on size and a negative one for sizesqr indicates an inverted u-shape
relationship. If the coeﬃcient on size is negative and sizesqr positive, the
relationship is u-shaped. This implies economies of scale at lower produc-
tion levels and diseconomies of scale at higher levels (Ikhide 2000: 17). A
non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for sizesqr implies a linear relationship. Flamini et
al. (2009: 13) ﬁnd evidence for economies of scale when studying the deter-
minants of commercial bank proﬁtability of banks in SSA: Larger banks can
increase net margins due their strong market power. This relation seems to
be non-linear, because of managerial and bureaucratic ineﬃciencies of too
large banks.
The ratio of equity to total assets (capital) is used to measure capi-
tal. Banks with a well capital ratio tend to borrow less and have lower
costs of refunding when capital markets are imperfect (Athansoglou 2008:
126f., Flamini et al. 2009: 7). Moreover, they have a lower probability of
bankruptcy. Hence, a negative relationship between bank equity and net
margins is expected, as long as highly capitalized banks do not decrease
remarkably the interest charged on loans (Levine 2003: 8).
8Banks in SSA are especially threatened by credit risk, because of insuf-
ﬁcient legal frameworks, creditor rights and borrower information (Flamini
et al. 2009: 7). Credit risk is captured by the ratio of loan-loss provisions
to loans (risk).2
Next to interest-earning business, banks are active in non-lending activi-
ties. This may have an impact on the pricing of loan products in the case of
a cross-subsidization of bank products (Levine 2003: 9). The ratio of non-
interest income to total assets (fee income) is used to control for diﬀerent
income sources. Fee-based activities are generally less risky in contrast to
interest-earning activities (Flamini et al. 2009: 7).
Diﬀerences in bank assets are reﬂected in the ratio of liquid assets (cash
and deposit balances, including reserve requirements) to total assets (liq-
uidity) (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004: 603). Highly liquidized banks may
earn lower net margins (Levine 2003: 9). In contrast, the opportunity costs
due to a large liquidity ratio might be transferred to borrowers (Martinez
Peria/Mody 2004: 519).
Market share (share) is measured by individual banks’ assets to total
assets of the banking sector. A higher market share implies more market
power and thus a higher net margin (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004). In con-
trast, if larger banks have a higher market share, they may pass the beneﬁts
of economies of scale to their customers in the form of lower margins (Mar-
tinez Peria/Mody 2004: 519).
Data on Foreign Bank Presence
Claessens et al. (2008) have recently compiled data on foreign bank presence
for 103 developing nations for the years 1995 to 2006. The data set rests
upon the IBCAs Bankscope database and covers all developing countries
with more than ﬁve active banks with reports to Bankscope in 2006. It
includes all commercial, savings, cooperative, medium- and long-term credit
banks as well as bank holdings and holding companies that reported to
Bankscope at least for one year between 1999 and 2006 (Claessens et al.
2008: 39). The ﬁrst measure of foreign bank presence is given by the ratio
of the number of foreign banks to the total number of banks in a country
(number measure). The data are available for the years 1995 to 2006. The
second measure relates the assets of foreign banks to total banking sector
assets (asset measure). These data are only available until 2005, because
some banks have not yet reported to Bankscope for the year 2006 when the
data base was established. The main diﬀerence of this data set compared to
earlier ones (for example Beck et al. 2000) is that it diﬀerentiates between
2Flamini et al. (2009) proxy credit risk by the loans to customer and short-term funding
ratio. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (1999) measure risk by the loans to total assets (assets) ratio.
Another risk measure is the ratio of loan-loss provisions to assets (see Athanasoglou et al.
2008: 127).
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north-south and south-south banks.
While Claessens et al. (2008) provide information on foreign bank pres-
ence for most developing countries, this paper concentrates on 17 low-income
countries of SSA.3 The published data set on foreign bank presence by
Claessens et al. (2008) does not comprise information on the country of
origin of each bank considered in the study. Hence, a detailed shareholder
analysis was conducted in order to identify the country of origin of all banks
in the sample of countries between 1999 and 2006. Relating to the direct
shareholder structure, a bank is classiﬁed as foreign if 50% or more of the
shares are majority held by a foreign investor, and as domestic otherwise. A
bank is classiﬁed as south-south bank if these shares are held by an investor
from another developing country and as north-south bank otherwise. The
selection of low-income countries in SSA primarily depends on data avail-
ability regarding the shareholders of the banks. Due to the limits of the
shareholder analysis, the sample period is limited to the years 1999 to 2006.
Unfortunately, the dataset of Claessens et al. (2008) does not distin-
guish between regional and non-regional south-south banks. To explore if
there are any diﬀerent eﬀects between regional and non-regional south-south
3Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. Accord-
ing to the World Bank Classiﬁcation, Angola has been a low-income country until 2003,
Cameroon until 2004. Actually, both countries are lower-middle income countries.
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banks, the data set of Claessens et al. (2008) was adapted in a further step.
Based on the shareholder analysis the share of north-south, regional and
non-regional south-south banks assets was newly calculated. As there are
some diﬀerences regarding the classiﬁcation of banks compared to Claessens
et al. (2008), the calculated ratios do not always ﬁt with the data on foreign
bank presence provided by Claessens et al. (2008). All in all, the presence
of foreign banks is overestimated (see Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix).
Country-Speciﬁc Variables
To control for the macroeconomic environment, the growth of GDP per
capita (growth) and the annual growth rate of inﬂation (inﬂation) are used
as control variables. These variables are from the World Development Indi-
cators of the World Bank. Growth controls for cyclical output eﬀects which
may have a positive eﬀect on bank eﬃciency. In contrast, a decreasing
GDP growth indicates a poorer credit quality and loan defaults, and thus
a negative relationship to the eﬃciency of banks (Flamini et al. 2009: 10).
Inﬂation growth (inﬂation) may have a positive eﬀect on domestic banks’
eﬃciency in case of expected inﬂation, when banks immediately adjust their
net margins.
The variable concentration is deﬁned as the assets of the three largest
banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. The variable is based on
11the Bankscope database and calculated on the country level. It is extracted
from the Financial Structure Dataset described in Beck et al. (2000). In-
cluding this variable in the estimation is not without problems as the sample
of banks which report to Bankscope increases over time (Uhde/Heimeshoﬀ
2009: 1303). Concentration is related to share which is computed at the
bank level. Both variables will be equal to one, if there is only a single bank
in a country. However, there might also be market with high concentration
in which banks have only a small market share (Demirg¨ ucc-Kunt et al. 2004:
604).
3.2 Comparison of Domestic and Foreign Banks’ Eﬃciency
In Table 3.2 the eﬃciency of domestic, north-south and south-south banks
is compared. Domestic banks have signiﬁcant higher net margins com-
pared to south-south banks. North-south banks also have (not signiﬁcantly)
higher net margins compared to south-south banks. The net margins of
regional (SSA) south-south banks are (signiﬁcantly) smaller compared to
non-regional (non SSA) south-south banks.
North-south banks have signiﬁcantly lower costs compared to domestic
and south-south banks. Whereas north-south banks may concentrate on
the wholesale segment, south-south banks may be more often active in the
segment of SMEs, where risks and costs are higher. Moreover, south-south
banks have an informational disadvantage compared to domestic banks who
have signiﬁcantly lower costs. North-south banks may overcome some of the
informational disadvantages, because of modern practices and technologies.
The costs to assets ratio is signiﬁcantly higher for non SSA south-south
banks compared to SSA south-south banks, indicating some informational









non SSA south-south 72 8.86
SSA south-south 178 6.30
a. All values are in percentages.
b. Sample period: 1999-2006.
c. Pairs of entries that are signiﬁcant diﬀerent from each other are in boldface.
The results regarding overhead costs are similar to those of Van Horen
12(2007) for SSA. She ﬁnds that the overhead costs of south-south banks
are (not signiﬁcantly) higher compared to north-south banks. In contrast
to this study, Van Horen (2007) ﬁnds that net interest margins of south-
south banks are (not signiﬁcantly) higher compared to north-south banks.
The diﬀerent ﬁndings compared to Van Horen (2007) may be the result of
a diﬀerent sample of countries (low- and middle-income countries) within









non SSA south-south 66 9.07
SSA south-south 177 6.35
a. All values are in percentages.
b. Sample period: 1999-2006.
c. Pairs of entries that are signiﬁcant diﬀerent from each other are in boldface.
3.3 Speciﬁcation Analysis and Results
To reduce the impact of outliers, the top and bottom 1% observations of
each dependent variable were dropped. To analyze models 1 to 3, pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) is not appropriate as there are signiﬁcant indi-
vidual, bank-level eﬀects in each estimation model. These eﬀects are either
ﬁxed or random. In the Fixed-Eﬀects (FE) model the individual-speciﬁc
eﬀects αi are allowed to be correlated with the regressors, while the latter
are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error uijt (Cameron/Trivedi 2009:
231): εijt = αi +uijt. In contrast, in the Random-Eﬀects (RE) model, αi is
a random variable which is uncorrelated with the regressors. A test of overi-
dentifying restrictions proposed by Schaﬀer and Stillman (2006) is used to
test the RE against the FE model, i.e. if the αi are uncorrelated with the re-
gressors. The test is similar to a Hausman test, but has the main advantage
of being applicable in case of heteroscedastic and clustered errors (Schaf-
fer/Stillman 2006). For both dependent variables, net margin and costs, the
RE estimator is rejected at the 1 % level. Hence, the eﬀects are ﬁxed, and
pooled OLS and the RE estimation are inconsistent (Cameron/Trivedi 2005:
259).
An alternative to mean-diﬀerencing with a FE estimation is to take the
ﬁrst diﬀerence (FD) method. This method eliminates the individual-speciﬁc
13eﬀects αi, too. Hence, the estimations are consistent when OLS is applied
(Cameron/Trivedi 2005: 263). Applying the FD estimator also drops the
coeﬃcient for time-invariant variables. In the data set considered in this
thesis, there is only a constant number of foreign banks to total banks in
some countries between 1999 and 2006. As there has only to be some vari-
ation in each variable for some cross-section units (Wooldridge 2002: 266),
the regressions include all 17 countries.
In all estimation models cluster robust standard errors are used to correct
for heteroskedasticity and within-bank serial correlation (Cameron/Trivedi
2005: 705f.). By clustering on each domestic bank, the errors are correlated
over time for each bank, but not across banks. Clustering on the bank level
produces consistent estimates of the standard errors if there is serial corre-
lation in the idiosyncratic error term (Drukker 2003: 171). Applying cluster
robust standard errors in the estimation model leads to larger standard er-
rors compared to OLS and thus to more insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.
In a ﬁrst step, the econometric results for equation 1 and 2 are presented.
Whereas Tables 1 and 2 include the results for the number measure of foreign
bank presence, Table 3 and 4 present the results for the asset measure of
foreign bank presence. The ﬁrst and the second column of each Table show
the results for the FE estimator. The third and the fourth column contain
the results for the FD regression.
Domestic banks’ net margins are positively related to foreign banks’
respectively north-south’ and south-south banks’ presence. The results sug-
gest that despite the presence of foreign banks, domestic banks are able to
increase their net margins, indicating a lack of competitive pressure. There
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients of north-south’ and
south-south banks’ presence.
Turning to the bank-speciﬁc control variables, we see that there is a an
inverted-u-shaped relationship between bank size and net margins. Whereas
the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for bank size indicates economies of
scale, the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for sizesqr reﬂects diseconomies
of scale of too large banks.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for costs indicates that domestic
banks pass higher costs to their customers through higher net margins. Fee
income and liquidity are negatively related to the net margins of domestic
banks.
Higher inﬂation rates imply lower net margins. This result is in con-
trast to many other studies (e.g. Flamini et al. 2009: 14, Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt/Huizinga 1999: 399f., Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2003: 613). However,
Crowley (2007: 12) ﬁnds a negative relationship between inﬂation and inﬂation-
adjusted net interest margins to total assets for English-speaking African
countries. Angelini and Cetorelli (2000: 33) also ﬁnd a negative relation
between price-cost margins and inﬂation, albeit the coeﬃcient for inﬂation
is insigniﬁcant. Hence, net margins of domestic banks in SSA seem to be
14Table 1: Estimation Results for Net Margin (number measure)
net margin (1) (2) (3) (4)







size 0.1090*** 0.1110*** 0.1450*** 0.1460***
(0.0316) (0.0312) (0.0422) (0.0419)
sizesqr -0.0047*** -0.0049*** -0.0067*** -0.0076***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0020)
capital 0.0065 0.0041 -0.0527 -0.0514
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0436) (0.0440)
costs 0.4570*** 0.4560*** 0.7410*** 0.7480***
(0.1650) (0.1640) (0.1960) (0.2000)
risk 0.0078 0.0079 0.0133*** 0.0135***
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0046)
fee income -0.4500** -0.4450** -0.5920*** -0.5970***
(0.1740) (0.1750) (0.1590) (0.1600)
liquidity -0.0409* -0.0410* -0.0414** -0.0406**
(0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0165) (0.0166)
share 0.0496 0.0569 0.1010* 0.1000*
(0.0512) (0.0515) (0.0526) (0.0529)
concentration -0.0418 -0.0465 -0.0653** -0.0650**
(0.0323) (0.0328) (0.0307) (0.0306)
growth 1.32 1.83 0.471 -0.472
10−5 (41.50) (42.00) (34.40) (33.80)
inﬂation -11.7** -11.9** -6.93* -6.89*
10−5 (4.84) (4.77) (3.87) (3.86)
N 351 351 256 256
Rsqr 0.255 0.258 0.387 0.387
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
countercyclical, rather that banks charge risk premia (Angelini and Cetorelli
2000: 32).
Domestic banks’ costs are positively related to foreign bank presence.
In the FD estimation the coeﬃcient for fbtb is highly signiﬁcant. The re-
sults indicate that there are signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects between foreign and
domestic banks. As the latter have to invest in new practices and technolo-
gies, their costs rise in the short-run. Whereas the coeﬃcient for south-south
banks is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level in the FD estimation, the coeﬃcient for
north-south banks is signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level. The coeﬃcients are diﬀerent
from each other at the 0.05 level: F(1, 74) = 4.08, Prob ≺ F = 0.046.
The bank-speciﬁc control variable size shows that larger banks gain from
economies of scale. The variable sizesqr is positive and signiﬁcant for the
FD estimation, indicating an u-shaped-relationship.
The coeﬃcients for capital indicate that well-capitalized domestic banks
generally have smaller costs. The negative impact of risk may be explained
by the skimping hypothesis proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997). Ac-
cording to the hypothesis, banks who reduce their eﬀorts in screening bor-
rowers, seem to be more cost eﬃcient in the short-run (Berger and DeYoung
1997: 854). A higher market share implies signiﬁcantly lower costs. More-
over, domestic banks’ costs are positively related to increasing inﬂation rates.
This result is in line with Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004: 614).
The results for the estimation with the asset measure of foreign banks’
presence are presented in Tables 3 and 4. For net margins, the results
15Table 2: Estimation Results for Costs (number measure)
costs (1) (2) (3) (4)







size -0.0474* -0.0460* -0.0835*** -0.0826***
(0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0276) (0.0287)
sizesqr 0.0014 0.0013 0.0026** 0.0025*
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013)
capital -0.0837*** -0.0848*** -0.1140** -0.1150**
(0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0461) (0.0462)
risk -0.0096** -0.0095** -0.009** -0.0091**
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0043)
fee income 0.1780** 0.1810** 0.0764 0.0850
(0.0722) (0.0736) (0.0935) (0.0979)
liquidity -0.0282 -0.0281 -0.0175 -0.0187*
(0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0112) (0.0111)
share -0.0978*** -0.0946*** -0.1020*** -0.1000***
(0.0343) (0.0332) (0.0366) (0.0362)
concentration 0.0191 0.0170 0.0284 0.0276
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0202)
growth 8.85 9.19 11.20 13.50
10−5 (21.80) (21.40) (18.90) (19.2)
inﬂation 5.71* 5.62* 5.61* 5.50*
10−5 (2.97) (3.00) (3.17) (3.23)
N 348 348 251 251
Rsqr 0.372 0.372 0.404 0.413
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
are very similar compared to the results in Table 1. However, the sign
for the variables fbtb and sbtb is negative now (but not signiﬁcant) in the
FD estimation indicating some competitive pressure. The results for the
dependent variable costs are likewise similar to the previous results for the
number measure of foreign bank presence, albeit there are some diﬀerences
regarding the signiﬁcance of some variables. Especially, the coeﬃcient for
sbtb is now signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the FE estimation. The coeﬃcient
for nbtb is insigniﬁcant for both the FE as well as the FD estimations.
Tables 5 and 6 include the results for the newly calculated data set on
foreign bank presence. In the FD estimation for the dependent variable
net margin, the coeﬃcient for ssanew is negative and signiﬁcant. This
implies that especially foreign banks from the same geographic region induce
competitive pressure on domestic banks. For costs, the coeﬃcient ssanew is
positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that domestic banks primarily beneﬁt
from spillover eﬀects of technologies and practices from SSA south-south
banks.
4 Conclusions
Based on the Eclectic Theory, this paper identiﬁed the competitive advan-
tages and expansion strategies of MNBs from developing countries compared
to MNBs from industrialized countries in SSA. The theoretical results show
that MNBs from developing countries have ownership-speciﬁc advantages in
16Table 3: Estimation Results for Net Margin (asset measure)
net margin (1) (2) (3) (4)







size 0.1230*** 0.1230*** 0.1960*** 0.1960***
(0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0473) (0.0473)
sizesqr -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0091*** -0.0091***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022)
capital 0.0446 0.0446 0.0063 0.0044
(0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0571) (0.0566)
costs 0.4070** 0.4060** 0.7120*** 0.7150***
(0.1700) (0.1730) (0.2220) (0.2230)
risk 0.0038 0.0037 0.0102* 0.0106*
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0058)
fee income -0.4860*** -0.4840** -0.6230*** -0.6270***
(0.1820) (0.1880) (0.1560) (0.1600)
liquidity -0.0550*** -0.0552*** -0.0427** -0.0424**
(0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0172) (0.0172)
share 0.0446 0.0452 0.1150* 0.1170*
(0.0526) (0.0512) (0.0622) (0.0631)
concentration -0.0590* -0.0599* -0.0818** -0.0805**
(0.0342) (0.0323) (0.0369) (0.0350)
growth 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
inﬂation -10.00* -10.20** -9.23** -9.05**
10−5 (5.22) (5.09) (4.23) (4.38)
N 303 303 209 209
Rsqr 0.278 0.278 0.379 0.379
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
Table 4: Estimation Results for Costs (asset measure)
costs (1) (2) (3) (4)







size -0.0540** -0.0537* -0.0662** -0.0662**
(0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0267) (0.0267)
sizesqr 0.0016 0.0016 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
capital -0.0863*** -0.0831*** -0.1240** -0.1190**
(0.0327) (0.0305) (0.0484) (0.0473)
risk -0.0103** -0.0111*** -0.0087** -0.0093**
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041)
fee income 0.2070** 0.2220** 0.1290 0.1350
(0.0912) (0.0954) (0.1190) (0.1210)
liquidity -0.0347* -0.0362** -0.0182 -0.0192
(0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0130) (0.0129)
share -0.0987** -0.0917** -0.1070*** -0.1100***
(0.0390) (0.0379) (0.0383) (0.0375)
concentration 0.0425* 0.0350 0.0452** 0.0425*
(0.0237) (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0225)
growth 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
inﬂation 8.26** 6.84* 8.78** 8.48**
10−5 (3.36) (3.55) (3.92) (3.82)
N 305 305 208 208
Rsqr 0.430 0.439 0.430 0.434
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
17Table 5: Estimation Results for Net Margin (new asset measure)
net margin (1) (2) (3) (4)









size 0.1250*** 0.1250*** 0.1960*** 0.1930***
(0.0355) (0.0347) (0.0473) (0.0462)
sizesqr -0.0056*** -0.0055*** -0.0091*** -0.0089***
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0022)
capital 0.0441 0.0432 0.0068 -0.0036
(0.0427) (0.0400) (0.0570) (0.0562)
costs 0.4120** 0.4290** 0.7160*** 0.7230***
(0.1670) (0.1730) (0.2180) (0.2220)
risk 0.0038 0.0048 0.0099* 0.0116**
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0058)
fee income -0.4880*** -0.4930*** -0.6240*** -0.6360***
(0.1810) (0.1860) (0.1570) (0.1610)
liquidity -0.0547*** -0.0517*** -0.0431** -0.0422**
(0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0175)
share 0.0436 0.0494 0.1130* 0.1200*
(0.0532) (0.0518) (0.0615) (0.0625)
concentration -0.0595* -0.0582* -0.0792** -0.0696**
(0.0340) (0.0308) (0.0370) (0.0330)
growth 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
inﬂation -10.6** -9.05* -10.1** -7.43
10−5 (4.87) (4.93) (4.21) (5.12)
N 303 303 209 209
Rsqr 0.278 0.290 0.380 0.391
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
Table 6: Estimation Results for Costs (new asset measure)
costs (1) (2) (3) (4)









size -0.0529* -0.0512* -0.0674** -0.0660**
(0.0267) (0.0275) (0.0262) (0.0266)
sizesqr 0.0015 0.0014 0.0019 0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
capital -0.0878*** -0.0840*** -0.1230** -0.1200**
(0.0320) (0.0299) (0.0480) (0.0475)
risk -0.0102** -0.0113*** -0.0085** -0.0090**
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041)
fee income 0.2070** 0.2220** 0.1240 0.1290
(0.0902) (0.0949) (0.1170) (0.1190)
liquidity -0.0335* -0.0355** -0.0166 -0.0172
(0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0131) (0.0131)
share -0.0976** -0.0931** -0.1080*** -0.1100***
(0.0393) (0.0385) (0.0379) (0.0371)
concentration 0.0370 0.0303 0.0381* 0.0362
(0.0253) (0.0229) (0.0222) (0.0222)
growth 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
inﬂation 7.96** 5.42 8.96** 8.27*
10−5 (3.52) (4.27) (4.08) (4.42)
N 305 305 208 208
Rsqr 0.424 0.434 0.424 0.426
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p≺ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≺ 0.05, ∗p ≺ 0.1
18the form of special management and marketing skills as well as distribution
capabilities of cheap and diﬀerentiated products and services, especially if
they invest in other developing nations like SSA. In contrast, MNBs from
industrialized countries more often possess state-of-the-art technologies and
practices. MNBs from developing countries are more able to couple with
the lack of institutional development and related problems in developing
countries compared to their industrialized counterparts. Hence, they also
follow market oriented motives when they invest in these countries. As
opposed to north-south banks who concentrate on the wholesale segment,
south-south banks are more likely to invest in the segment of SMEs as they
have the capabilities to deal with the uncertainty in this segment. If domes-
tic banks and south-south banks are more likely to be active in the same
target market, south-south banks might induce more spillover and competi-
tion eﬀects on domestic banks compared to north-south banks. Hence, from
a theoretical perspective, domestic banks’ eﬃciency may be more inﬂuenced
by the presence of south-south than north-south banks. Thus, this paper
contributes to the theoretical literature as it explains the market-seeking
strategies of south-south banks, and discusses the extent of spillover eﬀects
between north-south, south-south and domestic banks. Moreover, it appli-
cates the theories of MNBs and the knowledge gap theory to the African
banking sector.
A descriptive comparison between the eﬃciency of domestic, north-south,
regional and non-regional south-south banks shows that domestic banks have
higher net margins compared to north-south and south-south banks. The net
margins of regional south-south banks are (signiﬁcantly) smaller compared
to non SSA south-south banks indicating their higher eﬃciency. Whereas
north-south banks have signiﬁcantly lower costs compared to domestic and
south-south banks, non regional south-south banks have signiﬁcantly higher
costs compared to regional south-south banks.
The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of the eﬃciency eﬀects
of foreign bank presence, diﬀerentiating between north-south, regional and
non-regional south-south banks. The empirical results for 80 domestic banks
in SSA illustrate that there are indeed spillover eﬀects from foreign bank
presence, as there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship to domestic banks’
costs. Domestic banks have to invest to adopt modern technologies and
practices from foreign competitors, and especially from regional south-south
banks. The competitive pressure of north-south banks on domestic banks
is small. Hence, domestic banks are likely to downscale to other target
markets where they are able to increase their margins. In contrast, regional
south-south banks have a negative impact on domestic banks’ margins.
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23Appendix
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Bank-Speciﬁc Variables
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
costs 6.30 3.25 0.21 23.51 526
net margin 7.97 6.55 -2.30 114.80 524
size 11.18 1.22 7.13 14.47 541
sizesqr 126.53 27.26 50.90 209.39 541
capital 13.86 10.66 -39.48 62.91 541
risk 5.13 21.82 -89.23 431.05 480
fee income 3.81 2.69 -2.62 20.67 507
liquidity 31.23 25.40 -3.42 99.31 435
share 11.57 14.53 0.11 100.00 541
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Country-Speciﬁc Variables
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
growth 1.36 3.26 -7.53 17.17 587
inﬂation 14.37 46.56 -3.85 556.94 587
concentration 69.84 14.08 48.80 100.00 570
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Data on Foreign Bank Presence (Number
Measure)
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
fbtb 43.33 21.65 0 88 587
sbtb 16.06 12.21 0 50 587
nbtb 27.42 15.93 0 60 587
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Data on Foreign Bank Presence (Asset
Measure)
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
fbtb 46.81 24.65 0.00 100.00 526
sbtb 10.14 13.20 0.00 100.00 526
nbtb 36.67 22.59 0.00 86.00 526
24Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Data on Foreign Bank Presence (New
Asset Measure)
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
fbtbnew 48.74 24.53 0.00 100.00 521
sbtbnew 2.93 5.02 0.00 55.12 521
ssanew 7.33 10.30 0.00 51.52 521
nbtbnew 38.48 22.39 0.00 94.59 521
25